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Cross-Border Regionalisation in the ‘New
Europe’ – Theoretical Reflection with Two
Illustrative Examples
JOUNI HÄKLI1
Regionalization has recently become a catchword both in political practice and
academic discourse. Even if the idea of the ‘Europe of the Regions’ is no longer
uncritically accepted, regional imagination still frequently informs the analysis of the
European political order. This article seeks to chart alternative ways of
understanding political change in Europe. It first outlines the current understanding
of the role of regions in Europe, and seeks to put contemporary ideas into historical
perspective. The article then examines the standard way of analyzing regionalism,
the ‘top-down, bottom-up’ metaphor. By looking at the scales of politics from a
social constructionist perspective the article shows that this widely-used metaphor
does not adequately capture much of the political history of region-building, nor is it
able to identify the relations of power involved in regionalization in the era of
expanding trans-boundary linkages and networks across state borders. By illustrating
cross.-border regionalization with examples from Karelia and Catalonia, the article
seeks to assess some of the tensions that arise between the new deterritorialized
forms of trans-regional governance and the traditional democratic practice, which is
still tightly connected to areal political spaces both institutionally and in terms of
inhabitants’ collective identity. The article argues for a heightened awareness of the
relational social power characteristic of network governance and potential leaks from
the ‘territorial containers’ of democratic practice.
Regions in Europe
A lot of faith has been vested in ‘the region’ as a motor of economic
development, as a vehicle of local democracy, and as a level of
government in Europe. The appreciation of regions was particularly
high in the 1970s and 1980s when several European states launched
decentralisation policies and regionalist movements were able to exert
pressures on state governmental structures. The European integration
process, together with globalisation of the economy and post-Fordist
forms of production, have further encouraged this enthusiasm by
pointing at an increasingly important role for the region as an
intermediary functional space. These developments have coincided with
a renewed interest in regional identities and cultures both among
researchers and policy makers. Thus, the slogan ‘Europe of the
Regions’ was coined to denote the new political, cultural, and economic
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order which was expected to augment, and perhaps even challenge, the
system of governance based on European nation-states.1
More sceptical views about the role of the region have been put
forward recently. Studies have shown that regional success stories,
such as Catalonia, Baden-Württemberg, and northern Italy, are
exceptions rather than the rule. The European meso-level government is
vaguely defined and incoherent, and the institutional status of regions
varies from country to country, and even within countries (e.g. Spain).
In most cases regions have not become important mediators for local
democracy, as the scale is too broad for people’s everyday concerns. In
this regard municipalities and other local communities have retained a
strong role.2 Furthermore, economic growth rates and regional Gross
Domestic Product levels per capita still vary greatly between the
European regions despite the cohesion policies of the European Union.
Over the past decade, regional income disparities have widened in
nearly all EU member states. Similarly, regional differences in
unemployment rates have also increased and in many countries this has
gone hand-in-hand with a more unequal distribution of personal income
and a fall in the share of wages in total income.3 In all, several factors
indicate that the region has commonly failed the expectations of
becoming a strong arena of political and economic regulation, or a
general solution to the problems of the post-Fordist global economy.4
Yet, it is an undeniable fact that European integration and its
concomitant economic and cultural changes have restructured the
relationships between regions, states, and the European Union. Today’s
Europe is not the group of Keynesian welfare states of the Cold War
era, but a more fragmented and complex arena where institutional and
non-institutional actors, representing different, segmented and
overlapping interest groups, participate in the co-ordination of public
policies. This arena, and the regions’ role in it, can be seen differently
depending on the perspective adopted. From a sociological point of
view, new power alliances have emerged within the private sector and
across the private-public divide in attempts to create viable strategies
for economic growth in localities (cities) and regions. Actors
representing the institutional region, or co-ordinating private interests
on a regional level, may be involved in informal and heterogeneous
policy-making networks which include European, national and local
actors both from public and private sectors.5
From a political science perspective, most European regions have
not acquired a strong governmental and institutional status, but
nevertheless are faced with the task of governance. Following Bob
Jessop governance can be understood broadly as attempts to attain
collective goals and purposes in and through specific configurations of
governmental and non-governmental institutions, organisations and
practices.6 Thus, instead of a coherent and ready-made regional system
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upon which European policy-making could be built, we should expect
to find a more fluid, less systematic, and a highly diversified field of
regional governance, where regions perform very differently depending
on their ability to mobilise and co-ordinate both human and economic
resources for collective goal-attainment. Here regions such as Wales,
Catalonia, and the Northern League are showing good performance,
partly due to the strong identity of the regions, while in most European
countries interests remain relatively weakly organised at the regional
level.7
Finally, from a geographical perspective the European regional level
lacks coherence, with the exception of the NUTS-divisions produced
for EU policy-making and statistical purposes. This is an inevitable
result of the different traditions and histories of regional divisions in the
member countries.8 In some cases the map of European regions, most
often based on NUTS II regions, corresponds well with the popular
understanding of the cultural and/or functional regions of the country.
However, often it does not, as in Finland where the provinces, whether
historical or functional, are much more numerous than the NUTS II
regions.9 Thus, while the region may serve as a convenient label for a
certain (meso, intermediary) ‘level’ of governance and policy, it is also
important to appreciate the particular geography of regions as concrete
places and contexts. This geographical diversity of Europe is a
challenge for research in at least two ways. First, by shifting attention
to particular paths of development it negates over-blown arguments
about the end of the nation-state and the region-based reorganisation of
the European political space. Second, in attempts to understand the
current transformations of European political order, it raises the issue
of how EU policies, transnational economic influences, and local,
regional, and national cultural traditions are translated into actions by
policy-making networks.
By looking at regionalisation across state borders this article seeks
to contribute to our understanding of the nature of the European
political transformation. It first traces the outlines of the modern
imagination of politics as related to space – the assumption of spatial
congruence between cultural identity, economic activity, and political
processes. By describing the rise of regional discourses in Europe it
attempts to locate the region as a political space, and to point out some
major weaknesses in the mainstream conceptions of the relationship
between the state and the region. The article pays particular attention to
one influential pattern of thought, the frequently used twin metaphors
of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’, and contrasts it with a social
constructionist understanding of political scales. The article argues for
the latter as a useful theoretical avenue for attempts to identify the
relations of power involved in trans-boundary regionalisation.
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The article then looks at how regionalisation can be conceptualised
as a form of networking which both reproduces and departs from the
modernist understanding of the relationship between politics and areal
space. To question the political and cultural reorganisation of Europe,
the logic of region-building is discussed and illustrated by looking into
the prospects of regionalisation in Karelia and Catalonia. The two
areas stretching across state borders represent quite different
geographical contexts where the EU policies, imaginations of a new
spatiality, and political, economic, and cultural agency come together.
By discussing recent developments in Karelia and Catalonia the article
also seeks to chart some of the tensions that arise between the new
deterritorialised forms of trans-regional governance and the traditional
practices of democracy, which are still tightly connected to areal
political spaces both institutionally and in terms of inhabitants’
collective identity.
The article argues for a heightened awareness of the relational social
power characteristic of network governance and potential leaks from
the ‘territorial containers’ of democratic practice. Furthermore, the
article argues that the new Europe is less a ‘Europe of Regions’ than a
‘Europe with regions’. Regions certainly play a role in the new
European political order, but seldom as institutional actors.10 Arguably,
they are often more influential through the regional variation of
political tradition, economic performance and cultural particularities
which affect the ways in which European, national and local policies
are translated into practice in different contexts. Yet it is also likely that
some of the more economically and institutionally powerful regions will
continue to have an impact on the European political order.
Consequently, the political processes on European, national, regional,
and local levels are in dialectic, rather than in determining,
relationships with each other.11 To understand this overlapping and
multiple nature of governance in the 'New Europe', it is necessary first
to look at the geographical imagination informing the modern
conception of the spatiality of politics.
The state against regions?
In the 20th century the spatiality of politics has come to be framed in a
thoroughly regional imagination in two connected ways. On one hand,
political spaces are conceived of as either containers (states), arenas
(localities, geopolitical spaces), or constituencies (territorial co-
presence of citizens) each of which set the stage for political
contestation areally.12 Wide agreement exists that the nation-state has
been the dominant scale in the European political order.13 On the other
hand, where doubt has been cast to the hegemony of the state, it has
largely been done with reference to alternative geographically
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circumscribed communities of various sizes and compositions.14 Thus,
the diminishing role of state as a political power has been equated with
the increasing irrelevance of its status and borders in the face of global
economic and information flows and structures of transnational
governance.15 Alternatively, the growing competition over investment
capital has been attributed to cities and regions as the new power
containers of the ‘glocalised’ world.16
While the social scientific analysis of politics has rarely dealt with
space and spatiality in explicit terms, a particular understanding of
spatiality has been implicit in the modern political discourse and
theory. This stubbornly areal imagination of politics is characterised
by the assumption that territorial congruence between cultural, political
and economic relations is the ideal form of political space. Such
thinking can be seen as nostalgia for the modern nation-state, but it can
be also be applied to various political scales ranging from the local to
the international.17 In this article the areal imagination of various
overlapping social relations is approached through the concept of
region, which has figured strongly in western discourses on the
fundamental organisation of social relations across space.
The word region derives from a latin word regere, which means to
rule. While this may suggest that the concept is an inherently political
one, historically such a connection cannot be upheld. The particular
connotations of ‘region’ have varied greatly over time and across
different cultural contexts.18 However, a politically influential (western)
conception of region as a functionally and/or relationally formed spatial
entity can be traced back to the governmental and scientific discourses
informing social policy-making in several European countries in the
19th century. At that time the states were growing increasingly
powerful in the regulation of society. The emerging social sciences
reflected this by developing theories of society where the latter was
assumed to be an integrated whole defined by the state territory.19
Importantly, the concept of region also gained prominence. It did so
particularly in attempts to rethink and formulate policy for a society
composed of socio-spatial unities, rather than mere individuals.20 Thus,
it was not only the nation state that was naturalised as  a  scale  in  the
analysis of social processes: on a smaller scale ‘region’ emerged as a
natural constituent part of ‘society’, replicating the vision of
‘fundamental spatial congruence between political, social and economic
processes’.21
The rise of the nation-state in the late 19th and early 20th century
tended to marginalise the concept of region in many social science
discourses, which increasingly came to equate modern society with the
state and its territory. Nevertheless, the region became an important
intellectual nexus for increasing governmental concern in the regulation
of society.22 What I have elsewhere termed the ‘invention of region’23
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encompassed the enhancement of the representation of space by maps
and statistics, and the desire to control the socio-spatial consequences
of the liberalisation of economic activities, both of which were
inseparably connected to the modernisation of governmental practice in
19th century Europe. While the state set territorial bounds to society in
social scientific analyses, the importance of region was quickly realised
by policy-makers and nation-builders in many countries. Regions
figured strongly in attempts to reform administrative systems and level
disparities in social conditions. Sometimes regional descriptions were
used for the popularisation of the principle of cultural ‘diversity in
unity’ so important for nation-building.24 Furthermore, in some political
and governmental discourses the region emerged as an expression of
the various spatially congruent orders and relations of the 'liberal civil
society', thus reinforcing a particular understanding of how politics is
related to space.25
While there is ample evidence of the political dominance of the
nation-state in the 19th and 20th centuries, it has also been shown that
the areal conception of politics was not restricted to the state level. The
processes of state formation were as much international as domestic,
and they contributed substantially to the construction of the ‘local’,
‘regional’ and ‘international’ as political scales.26 Consequently, these
‘levels’ of society were taken for granted, and often reified as political
scales in modern thought. To the degree, in fact, that it is still difficult
to view society without resorting to this 'layer cake model' of political
space. For the predominant ways of thinking, discussing, and acting
politically, the areal has become the given spatial concept, while the
political scales have taken a life of their own as separate levels.27
This type of thinking has commonly been reproduced in the ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ metaphors which often portray the regions and
the state in opposition to or outright contradiction with each other.
While sometimes helpful in reflecting social power structures, these
metaphors run the risk of fixing the regional as something clearly
distinguishable from the national, while in reality these often are
inseparably linked in social practices and only become significant in the
actors’ accounts of the scales of their activities and alliances.28 They
also rely too much on the idea of regions as the harbingers of a ‘New
Europe’ and a departure from the modernist conception of political
space, while in reality the regional scale emerged more or less in
association with the formation of nation-states. Thus, what at first sight
may seem like a revolutionary development may turn out to reproduce,
albeit on a smaller geographical scale, the patterns of thought
developed over the past two centuries of a territorially confined
imagination of politics.29
What is at stake here is not the political weight of European regions
as such. In fact the evidence suggests that the regional scale did not
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enjoy any particular salience before the Second World War.30 Rather I
am arguing that the top-bottom dualism not only fails to address
adequately the recent regionalisation processes in Europe, but it also
may effectively prohibit a deeper understanding of the ‘scale politics of
spatiality’.31 By pointing at areal spaces and competing levels, rather
than real political, social, and economic actors, the metaphor grossly
simplifies the processes of regionalisation and depicts spatial congruity
where non can actually be found. Hence, new theoretical and
methodological approaches should be applied in attempts to understand
contemporary changes in the European political order. In the following
section I briefly look into attempts to distinguish between different
types of regionalisation, and then take tentative steps toward the
conceptualisation of cross-border regionalisation without resorting to
the top-down/bottom-up dualism.
Regionalisation: new political spaces for whom?
The minimum definition of regionalisation is any number of social,
political and cultural activities which bring about regions, however
defined. Thanks to recent theoretical developments inspired by social
constructionist epistemologies, there is currently a broad understanding
of regions as social constructs and socio-spatial processes, rather than
fixed entities with definable essence.32 Regions do not exist ‘out there in
the real world’, independently of their representations, but rather they
are constructed and remade in association with manifold social
practices ranging from the routines of everyday life to institutional
projects.33 These practices subject regions to a discursive logic not
reducible to any single essence of regions. Thus, there are as many
different kinds of regions as there are discursive communities
producing texts and images of regions.
Space does not permit me to review the broad literature on different
forms of ‘new regionalisms’ in Europe. Suffice to say that it has been
typical to categorise the developments by distinguishing between
different forms of regionalisation, and/or different kinds of regions.34
Some of the main analytic distinctions run along the above mentioned
lines between regionalism from below, emanating from local activities
and identities, versus top-down regionalisation defined by national
governments or the EU. It is also commonplace to distinguish between
regionalisation as the formation of groups of countries and the
formation of sub-national territorial entities.35 Another categorisation
refers to different kinds of regions. For instance according to Michael
Keating and John Loughlin there are economic, historical, ethnic,
administrative, and political regions, each type being definable
according to particular criteria.36
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The distinction between top-down regionalisation and bottom-up
regionalism may readily seem to specify who these new spaces are for.
However, as the discussion above indicates, the dualism between
state/EU centered and locally/regionally based initiatives in
regionalisation is based on a deceptive simplicity. It suggests that we
can easily dissociate the interests of, for instance, national or EU actors
from those of the local or regional ones, while these in fact most often
feed into each other within overlapping social networks. A sweeping
oversimplification, the top-bottom dualism regularly acquires a
political meaning precisely because it serves in framing political issues
as the confrontation of one 'level' with another. Therefore it may be part
of the very discourse of regionalisation, rather than a tool in its
analysis.37
Importantly, the top-down/bottom-up dualism fails to address
adequately both the question of agency and the issue of power in
regionalisation processes. For instance, it is not clear how local is the
‘local’ company, whose strategies have an international reach.
Conversely, a national or EU politician whose political career depends
on the judgement of a local constituency is hardly a pure top-down
actor. Where the top-down metaphor fails in illuminating the logic of
region building, the idea of network may be more useful.38 In fact, the
discussion referring to regions, regionalisation or other areal spaces
actually often refers to networks of social, political and economic
actors involved in the negotiation of, for example, regional economic
development strategies. It is along with such network related activity
that region-building most often takes place as a constant, yet contested,
bargaining for mutually beneficial outcomes of co-operation among
actors that define themselves in regional terms.39
As physically based and neutral as such geographical areas as the
Alps-Adria region, Barents region, or the Mediterranean arch may
seem, they nonetheless are historically contingent products, constructed
by actors who have something at stake in the process.40 Instead of
regions being formed by social processes, there are regional formations
– networks of actors – consisting of governmental, economic and
cultural agents with overlapping interests which can be addressed by
defining them regionally. These formations are not necessarily
institutionally strong, but they may function well as loosely organised
passageways for all kinds of networks striving toward regional
governance.41
Despite the central role of agency in regionalisation, the issue of
who exactly is involved in the ‘common regional interest’ is seldom
made explicit. This makes regionalisation a thoroughly political
process, and a potentially effective way of exerting influence in various
fields of social life. A particular form of networking, it commonly takes
place in and through the co-ordination of social practices with the goal
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of achieving beneficial ends, whether economic, cultural,
administrative, or political.42 I  have  therefore  found  it  useful  to
emphasise what the agents of regionalisation have in common, rather
than highlighting the different scales or interests they might represent.
The most obvious similarities arise from shared assumptions
concerning the rationale of regionalisation, and the language in which
the regional worlds are delineated.
Like any human activity, regionalisation is dependent on the use of
language. A wealth of texts and images of particular regions is
produced by the actors involved.43 Hence, the regionalisation processes
can empirically be analysed through the texts and images in which
economic, cultural and political issues are dealt with in language which
portrays, or seeks to establish regional formations. To a certain degree,
then, it is possible to study regionalisation processes merely by
exploring their textual and iconographic surfaces. However, it should
be borne in mind that these texts and images do not come out of thin
air, nor does their evolution follow a mystical intrinsic logic, but rather
they are inseparably connected to economic, cultural and political
practices. Thus the proliferation of discourses of regionalisation should
be viewed against the profound transformations in Europe over the past
decade or so, as well as the potential gains that economic, political and
cultural actors expect from the formation of networks, alliances, and
co-operative schemes.44
Regionalisation is best understood as a discursive practice
employing a spatial metalanguage which enables the networked actors
to ally with each other strategically. The spatial contours of networking
are sometimes defined by relations of interdependency. However, when
actors seek to expand their capacity to governance, they may do so by
entering into relations with allies beyond this dependency. In the latter
case we can refer to regionalisation as ‘scale jumping’, that is, as the
politics of scale which proceeds through the construction of spatially
more extensive networks of association, and hence, what Kevin Cox
calls ‘spaces of engagement’.45 Conversely, actors controlling resources
located within particular areas may form, in Michael Keating’s terms,
‘place-based inter-class coalitions of political, economic and social
actors devoted to economic development in a specific location’.46 The
processes may be tension laden as often there are conflicts of interests
between social, economic and governmental agents.47 However, while
the development discourses often are contested, this is less frequently
the case with their regional settings.
Regionalisation, border and identity in Karelia and Catalonia
Regionalisation across state borders may take place as a relatively
uncomplicated process of actor networking and the discursive
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production of regions. In fact, there are several examples of cross-
border and transnational regions in Europe constructed through the
networking of social, political, and economic actors. Often cited
examples are the Barents sea region (Nordland, Tromsø, Finnmark,
Norrbotten, Lapland, Murmansk, Archangel and the Karelian
Republic) and ‘Four Motors for Europe’ (Baden-Württemberg,
Catalonia, Lombardia and Rhône-Alpes).48 Co-operation between the
neighbouring regions of Catalonia, Midi-Pyrénées and Languedoc-
Roussillon, and the Finnish and the Russian Karelias represents smaller
scale ‘spaces of engagement’ being constructed across state borders.49
Karelia is an interesting case among the European border regions in
at least two respects. On the one hand the region has a long history of
being a frontier zone between eastern and western cultural traditions,
although one that trade relations and cultural influences have
perforated in many ways.50 In the course of history the region has
belonged to both Finland and Russia, but following the Second World
War most of what was known as Karelia in the Finnish side was ceded
to Russia. On the other hand, for seven decades the Karelian border
region was a dividing line between two distinctive political systems and
ideologies, a fact that contributed to the non-permeable nature of the
border. A low degree of integration has been typical of state borders
dividing the former socialist and capitalist countries.51 The combination
of these cultural and historical realities, and their reflections in the
spatial identity of the people living near the border, condition the
emerging cross-border linkages in Karelia.52
On the Russian side of the border the Republic of Karelia forms
part of the Russian Federation and has a joint border of almost 700
kilometers with Finland, and hence the European Union. This border
area and socio-economic development in the Republic of Karelia are
currently under transition. Recent research suggest that the striking
differences in living standards, and politico-administrative cultures
between Finnish and Russian Karelia provide difficult conditions for
cross-border regionalisation.53 Thus, despite EU support in the form of
Interreg and Tacis programmes,54 the Karelian region is unlikely to
emerge as a powerful economic, cultural or political ‘space of
engagement’ in the near future.
The case of Catalonia is equally interesting in terms of the
relationship between cultural identity and regionalisation. In contrast to
Karelia, Catalonia exemplifies the meanings and functions of the state
border dividing an ethno-linguistic region within the European Union.55
The ‘Greater Catalonia’ (els Països Catalans)  is  often  seen  as
consisting of Catalan cultural areas in the Spanish side of the border
(the autonomous region of Catalonia, the Balearic islands, the eastern
part of the region of Aragon, and the region of Valencia), but also of
the ‘North Catalonia’ in southern France (the province of Pyrénées-
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Orientales in the southern part of Languedoc-Roussillon region). In the
20th century the leaders of Catalan nationalism have increasingly
sought to emphasise the region’s cultural distinctiveness from both the
Spanish and the French states. However, in the early 19th century the
Spanish and French national identities divided the local population in
the Franco-Spanish borderlands of the Cerdanya valley. This points to
the significance of state borders in the negotiation of national identities.
In fact, according to Peter Sahlins it was precisely the inhabitants of
the valley who sought to establish a clearly defined borderline to
distinguish between the Spanish and the French sides. The respective
national identities were first accentuated and substantiated in
connection with the demarcation and disputes over the borderline.56
This suggests that interrelated and complex national and regional
identities are an integral feature of the social, cultural and political life
in the Catalan borderlands.57
Catalonia is an interesting case also in economic terms. It is
currently one of the more prosperous regional economies in the
European Union. In addition to the culturally driven region-building in
Catalonia, there are several economically motivated efforts at
regionalisation taking place in the northeastern Spain. Catalonia
participates in inter-regional co-operation as one of the ‘Four motors
for Europe’, along with Baden-Württemberg, Lombardia and Rhône-
Alpes. Another regionalisation effort is the Mediterranean arch, which
consists of the Mediterranean coastal areas of Italy, France and Spain.
Also Catalonia forms a ‘Euroregion’ with its neighboring areas of
Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées in France, comprising the
ethno-linguistic Catalonia as a whole, but also areas with French
cultural tradition. A decidedly loose definition of objectives
characterises the Euroregion initiative, launched officially in 1991,
ranging from establishing a general principle of co-operation among
various actors in the participant regions to the goal of co-ordinating
regional projects of co-operation with parallel actions taken by the
respective state governments. At the same time a strong commitment to
the common market development in Europe is underlined, together with
the role of the Euroregion as an interlocutor between the local
communitarian politics and the politics on the European Union level.58
In Catalonia trans-regional networks are many and involve
numerous prominent actors. They also seem to effectively integrate the
local, regional, national and transnational spaces of engagement. For
instance, the career paths of several prominent Catalan politicians
weave together activities in local and regional, but also in national and
European representative institutions, thus fostering the creation of
extensive networks of governance.59 A case in point is Jordi Pujol, long
time president of the Generalitat de Catalunya, a highly respected
politician in European institutions, and the leader of CiU
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(Convergència i Unió), which for the past two decades has been the
strongest political coalition in elections for the Catalan regional
government. Pujol has consistently emphasised the government’s
readiness to enter into agreements with Spanish actors and the state for
mutual material benefit. Projects explicitly aiming at multi-level
governance, such as the Euroregion initiative, suggests a willingness
among the Catalan political elites to favor networks of co-operation for
enhanced self-government, rather than to strive for national (regional)
separatism. In fact, this networking gains solidity from a strong
Catalan identity, constructed not only in opposition to the Spanish
(Castilian) state, but also as a ‘project identity’ reflecting the region’s
dynamism and economic growth. The latter is evident for example in
the official rhetoric of the regional government, which promotes a
rather loose definition of Catalan identity: ‘Everyone who lives and
works in Catalonia is Catalan’.60
The border region of Karelia has little in common with Catalonia,
except for its location near an international boundary. The Republic of
Karelia is among the poorest regional economies in the areas bordering
Finland. Moreover, North-Karelia is one of the most depressed areas
within Finland with unemployment figures among the highest in the
European Union. Any cross-border linkages and co-operative initiatives
are therefore facing a context defined by shared peripherality and
pressing problems of economic and cultural survival. Furthermore,
challenges to cross-border regionalisation in Karelia arise not only from
poor economic performance of the border region, but also from deeply
rooted cultural distinctions reflected in the Finnish and Russian
identities. The recently launched EU programs, such as the Karelian
Interreg (implemented from the beginning of 1997), therefore need to
overcome both economic (material) imbalances and culturally
constructed divisions which afflict the Karelian border region.
The task is difficult and not in the least helped by the lack of co-
ordination between the different European Union cross-border
initiatives. Efforts to create long-standing linkages and co-operative
projects in Karelia have met with problems caused by sectoral divisions
between Interreg and Tacis programs, designated to EU internal and
external borders respectively. To counteract these difficulties the
authorities of the Karelian border regions are in the process of
establishing a Euroregion, which is expected to enable more co-
ordination in issues of mutual concern, as well as better possibilities to
utilise European Union funding for cross-border co-operation.
However, many problems still have to be resolved before the
Euroregion can be established. For example, the Finnish central
government is still somewhat reluctant when it comes to delegating
‘foreign affairs’ issues to the discretion of regional councils.61 Also the
Republic of Karelia may have difficulties in finding resources for
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Euroregion activities that may require a council composed of the
regions’ representatives, an office with personnel, and/or semi-
permanent working groups.62
In this respect Karelia is still far from being a political space
crossing the external border of the European Union. The Republic of
Karelia has not been able to utilise its politically privileged position
within the Russian federation, but has remained peripheral both from
the Finnish and the Moscow perspective.63 The deep income gap
between Russian and Finnish Karelia is likely to condition any efforts
at cross-border co-operation in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the
existing joint ventures and direct foreign investments have faced severe
difficulties because of the Russian economic crisis in the autumn of
1998. Both the uneven conditions and the faltering economy highlight
the importance of the European Union initiatives in the area. Tacis and
Interreg programmes have been utilised for transferring know-how and
material resources to Russian Karelia. However, while important in
many respects, these projects have usually had very limited life span
and reach. Their immediate influences are most often confined to the
network of actors concretely mobilised and resourced by the projects.
The apparent ease with which the social, political and economic
elites generate initiatives for cross-border networks and produce
illustrations of trans-boundary Karelia may conceal the low degree of
identification with the emerging cross-border region. To understand
how broad based regional identity is related to key-actor driven
regionalisation, it may be useful to distinguish between a nominal
identity and a virtual identity, where the former is the name and the
latter the experience of an identity.64 Regional discourses are important
in the communication of nominal identity. However, the degree to
which people organise themselves around these nominal identities
depends on the contexts in which they arise, on the social position of
the people involved, and the nature of their activities. The regional
images and discourses may be familiar to many, but their role as the
constituents of regional identities is contextually contingent. There are
several examples of actor networks involved in cross-border
regionalisation unable to strike responsive chords in the larger
population of the areas.65 Often  the  latter  remain  captured  by  a
geographical imagination defined by the traditional state boundaries,
while networks construct new spaces of engagement across them. In
other words, even though regionalisation may be a familiar process to
the larger population, through for instance media and education, the
experience of the region thus depicted and named may not feed into
positive identification with the cross-border community.
On the basis of the discussion above, the processes of
regionalisation in Karelia and Catalonia can be interpreted as actor
networks seeking to expand their capacity for governance. While the
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future of the ‘Euroregion Karelia’ is still uncertain, it illustrates well
the push within several European border regions towards increased
capacity for governance through networking. Euroregions are
commonly seen as avenues for better access to the European
Commission and EU funding. For the individual authorities
participation offers the chance to be prepared in terms of an established
partnership, as commonly required by the European Regional
Development Fund initiatives and programmes. Furthermore, precisely
because it opens direct connections between regional authorities and the
European Union, networking provides the former with more elbow
room in negotiations with their own national governments in issues of
regional development, decision making, and representation of interests.
Not surprisingly, networking seems to have quickly obtained a central
place in the contemporary ‘multi-level governance’.66
The processes of regionalisation also permit the development of
politics disconnected from areal spatiality. This is the case both in
Karelia and in Catalonia where the networks of governance extend well
beyond the regions’ institutional boundaries. What is less clear is how
consistent this form of political activity is with the citizens’ desire for
democratic participation. A vast majority of the population of these
border regions remain in their every-day lives very much connected to
the relations of local interdependency. There is an obvious risk that
decision-making involved in network-based governance may escape the
control of the areally defined political constituency.67 Another
interesting question is the role of shared language and culture in cross-
border regionalisation. It remains to be seen whether the Catalan
language and cultural tradition are able to integrate people across the
Franco-Spanish border, thus serving as a platform for an emerging
cross-border identity. Despite the favorable conditions of linguistic
affinity across the border it may well be that the modern ideal of spatial
congruence between political, cultural, and economic processes is not
easily achieved. In all, the experience from Karelia and Catalonia
seems to support the claim that the relationships between regions and
states are far from being simply contradictory or conflicting, and that
they cannot be adequately described in terms of a single dominant
direction (for example from top-down or bottom-up).
Conclusions
In this paper I have sought to accomplish two inter-related tasks. First,
my aim has been to outline the current political-economic transition in
Europe with reference to recent literature dealing with the history of
modern geographical imagination, and the rise of the regional question
in Europe. Second, I have explored the issue of cross-border
regionalisation as a form of networking for the negotiation of cross-
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border co-operative schemes, resulting in discourses of regions. This
approach puts emphasis on governance rather than government, and
along with that, views political and economic activities in the context of
cultural identity.
The multifarious processes of regionalisation have commonly been
interpreted as a sign of profound transformations in European political
space. Among the issues debated is whether the emerging regional
question is merely a logical continuation in the long disintegration
process of the great European polyethnic empires, or an altogether new
development reflecting the late modern networked forms of organisation
in the areas of communication, technology, culture, and economy.68 In
the former case we could understand regionalisation as a ‘ghost of the
past’, that is as the freeing of historical ties of regional and ethnic
loyalties from their imprisonment in the modern, but not yet fully
developed, territorial state-system. In the latter case regionalisation
would rather represent the promise of an entirely new model for the
formation of political spaces, new ways of organising power relations,
and new ways of conceiving the relationship between space, power and
identity.
On the basis of the preceding discussion it seems that the two
interpretations are complementary rather than exclusive. Supporting the
former view, the examples from Karelia and Catalonia make it difficult
to sustain the claim that the nation-state has suffered a significant blow
to its role as the dominant political organisation in Europe. Also the
idea of ‘Europe of Regions’ as a radical departure from the political
space defined by the traditional state system, seems to be an
overstatement carrying a strong element of wishful thinking.69 This
judgement can be made on two grounds. First, the language of
regionalisation reproduces the modern conception of politics.
Discourses on regions still involve the imagination of the political
based on the spatial overlap of collective identities, economic agency
and political space. Not only the founding geographical imagination
and the goals of regionalisation, but also the criteria according to which
its success is evaluated, reflect a traditional understanding of the
organisation of viable political space. Second, although regionalisation
may be an important issue to the elites involved, it is usually less
important to the larger population. Irrespective of the importance which
may be attached to cross-border regionalisation by institutionally-based
actors, the processes have enjoyed a very mixed appreciation among
the people living in the border areas. Even in cases where it is possible
to point at historical, cultural, and linguistic affinity across state
borders, like in the Catalan, Spanish-Moroccan or in the Hungarian
border areas, spatial identities based on the sovereignty of the state
appear to prevail rather than yield to new regional identities.70
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Nevertheless, the idea of an emerging new political order in Europe
has also found support, most visibly perhaps in the proliferation of
regionalisation processes based on political and economic networking.71
While there are many traditional elements present in the 'New Europe',
it is my understanding that regionalisation will bring about a more
polycentric Europe. The European Union has launched policies which
actively foster cross-border initiatives and regional co-operation both
within the EU and across its external borders. Numerous economic,
political, and cultural actors have also placed importance on cross-
border regionalisation in attempts to expand their capacity to
governance on various scales.72 This interest suggests that integration
and cohesion across state borders are widely seen as having
development potential in the EU, and that there is a will among
politicians and economic actors to seize the opportunity to form new
regional alliances, so as to utilise the funding provided by the EU
programmes, as well as enhance their capacities through strategic
networking.
Thus, independently of whether we look at the cultural, political and
economic success of cross-border regionalisation, or its modernist
conceptual foundation on the idea of 'region', it is very difficult to come
to the conclusion that cross-border regionalisation represents a
complete break with the modern political order in Europe. What is new
in the European regionalisation processes may lie more in what the
actor networks do, than in the spatial discourse they produce.
Regionalisation as networking, that is, as a particular way of forging
strategic alliances and transnational co-operative schemes, may well
bring about a ‘New Europe’. What remains an open question is
whether regional networking among political, social and cultural elites
creates spatially disembedded political formations, and if so, will
policy-making then divorce from its traditional territorial base and
disappear into complex intergovernmental and public-private networks.
This may be the paradox of the ‘Europe of the Regions’: it carries the
promise of a new political space which follows a thoroughly modernist
script, while in reality it is being constructed through experimentation
in new, increasingly deterritorialised forms of politics.
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